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Abstract
This paper examines the choice of government expenditure on pub-
lic goods and transfer payments (in the form of pension) in an over-
lapping generations model, in which individuals live for two ‘periods’
and expenditure is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. The
condition required for majority support of the social contract involved
in the PAYG scheme is established and shown to be independent of
tax rates and expenditure levels. The choice of expenditure composi-
tion can thus be made conditional on acceptance of the social contract.
Two decision mechanisms regarding the choice of government expendi-
ture are considered. The ﬁrst is positive and involves majority voting
and the second is normative and involves maximizing a social welfare
function. In each case the ratio of the transfer payment to public goods
expenditure depends, among other things, on the ratio of median to
mean income. A reduction in the skewness of the income distribution
is associated with a reduction in this ratio, at a decreasing rate.
JEL code: D72, H41, H53, H11
Keywords: Overlapping Generations, Equilibrium Growth,
Median Voter, Optimal Expenditure, Public Goods, Pen-
sions
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11 Introduction
There are substantial variations among countries in their tax structures and
composition of government expenditure.1 This paper examines the choice of
the composition of government expenditure in the context of an overlapping
generations model in which a pure public good and a transfer payment, in
the form of a pension, are tax-ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis.
The unconditional pension therefore involves a decision regarding eﬀective
income shifting within the life cycle as well as intra- and inter-generational
redistribution. Two decision mechanisms are considered. The ﬁrst is positive
and involves majority voting by members of each cohort regarding desired
pension and public good expenditure during the retirement period, on the
understanding that during the working period each cohort ﬁnances the ex-
penditure previously agreed by the preceding cohort and voters are aware of
the nature of the government budget constraint.2 There is therefore a social
contract in which each generation, in the retirement period, is able to bene-
ﬁt from the income and population growth of the following generation. The
majority voting equilibrium exhibits balanced growth with pensions and pub-
lic goods expenditure per capita both growing with population and income
growth, while their ratio remains constant.
The majority voting outcome reﬂects the selﬁsh preferences of the median
voter, who holds the balance of power, and involves a ‘dictatorship’ of the
minority by the majority. In the second approach, this allocation is compared
with a normative mechanism in which a decision-maker maximises a social
welfare function expressed in terms of the lifetime utilities of members of each
cohort; in relative terms all cohorts are treated equally along the balanced
growth path. The welfare function makes explicit the value judgements,
1For empirical evidence, see Creedy and Moslehi (2007a).
2Hassler et al. (2003, 2007), and Hassler et al. (2005) consider two-period overlapping
generations models in which individuals are born identical but become successful or un-
successful. Young individuals are able to aﬀect the probability of becoming successful by
making private investments. In their private behaviour, all individuals take the actions of
others as given and choose their best actions or investments. In their public behaviour,
individuals take into account how current political choice aﬀects the distribution of voters
and future policies.
2involving for example inter-personal comparisons of utility, of the judge. The
situation in which a judge would agree with the median voter — though for
entirely diﬀerent reasons — can thus be established. This approach, though
involving steady growth, contrasts with the large literature concentrating on
optimal expenditure in a growth framework. In such studies, a social planner
maximises the multi-period welfare function involving a representative agent
to obtain the Pareto optimal inter-temporal allocation: for example, see Chen
(2006) and Agénor (2008).
Relatively little attention seems to have been given to the analysis of the
composition of government expenditure. Nevertheless, there is a substantial
politico-economic literature on decisions involving government expenditure.
A majority of this literature focuses on one type of government expenditure,
either public goods expenditure or redistributive transfer payments. 3 Since
t h es i n g l et y p eo fg o v e r n m e n te x p e n d i t u r ei sﬁnanced by income taxation, the
choice of government expenditure in these models is determined by the tax
rate, which is often chosen by majority voting, stemming from the early work
of Meltzer and Richard (1981). Several recent studies consider more than one
type of government expenditure. Bearse et al. (2001) study majority voting
over a transfer payment and public education in a static framework. Has-
sler and et al. (2007) consider redistribution policy as well as provision of
public goods ﬁnanced by imposing a tax on the rich, which indicates the ex-
tent of redistribution. Creedy and Moslehi (2007a) examine majority voting
over government expenditure on transfer payments as well as public goods,
within a static framework. This paper follows this line of research, with a
focus on the composition of government expenditure within an overlapping
generations framework.
Since the emphasis of the present study is on the composition of expen-
diture rather than its total, as in Bearse et al. (2001), the income tax rate is
assumed to be exogenously ﬁxed; it is not a decision variable. This ensures
3For example, Tridimas (2001), Grossmann (2003) and Tridimas and Winer (2005)
consider expenditure on public goods, while Meltzer and Richard (1981), Grossman and
Helpman(1998), Hassler et al. (2003), Hassler et al. (2005), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999),
Azzimonti et al. (2006), and the survey by Borck (2007) concentrate on transfer payments.
3that voting is only over one dimension.4 After pointing out that this is a
common assumption, Tridimas (2001, p. 308) suggested that, ‘This is less
restrictive than it ﬁrst appears, since in practice governments are often con-
strained in the policy instruments that they may vary at anyone [sic]t i m e ’ .
In practice, tax and expenditure policies are usually debated separately and
stronger constraints are usually imposed on changes in income tax rates.
In the present dynamic context, explicit solutions for the components of
government expenditure can be found in which more inequality gives rise to
the transfer payment (here the pension) forming a larger proportion of total
government expenditure. This result is consistent with models examining
majority voting over the tax rate, with an unconditional transfer payment,
in which a consistent result is that more basic inequality leads to the choice
of a more redistributive tax and transfer structure. For examples, see Meltzer
and Richard (1981) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999). However, empirical
evidence concerning this relationship, based on cross-sectional data for a
range of countries, has been found to be mixed. By considering the com-
position, rather than absolute levels, of expenditure in a dynamic setting,
t h ep r e s e n ts t u d ys h o w st h a ti nv i e wo ft h ew i d er a n g eo ff a c t o r sa ﬀect-
ing the composition of expenditure, it may indeed in practice be diﬃcult to
observe a simple relationship between redistribution and basic inequality in
cross-country comparisons.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the framework of
analysis. In view of its central role, this section also examines the condition
under which a majority of the members of any cohort support the required
social contract between generations, whereby each generation agrees to ﬁ-
nance the pensions of those currently retired (and who, in view of popula-
tion growth, form a minority of the population at any time) knowing that
the next generation will do the same. In the present model there is thus no
conﬂict between generations. This involves extending the condition obtained
by Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1958).
4In some voting models involving more than one dimension, a two-stage procedure is
envisaged. Other studies use intermediate preferences and consider a multidimensional
policy with unidimensional conﬂict. However, the condition of intermediate preferences is
restricted; see Borge and Rattsø, J. (2004) for examples of both approaches.
4Support for the social contract does not actually depend on the precise
expenditure composition, so agreement can be obtained prior to voting over
the composition. Section 3 then characterizes the voting equilibrium regard-
ing government expenditure where voting takes place in each period when
individuals vote only on the pension to be paid during the next period, for a
given tax rate. Hence, there is no incentive for members of the old cohort to
vote (as their preferences are entirely selﬁsh). Those currently retired do not
have a second vote over the public good expenditure, from which they beneﬁt
(but do not help to ﬁnance), during the period, since this has already been
determined by their vote in the previous period.5 The preferences of members
of the young cohort are shown to be single-peaked, satisfying the suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a majority-voting equilibrium. Closed-form
solutions for expenditure on pensions and public goods are obtained. It is
also shown that the voting equilibrium is a balanced-growth equilibrium such
that all endogenous variables grow at the same rate.
Comparative static properties of the model and some numerical examples
are examined in Section 4. Section 5 examines the optimal composition of
government expenditure, deﬁned as the composition that maximises a social
welfare function expressed in terms of the lifetime utility of each generation.
Along a balanced growth path all cohorts are treated equally, so only one
cohort needs to be considered. Using a general form of welfare function, it
turns out that the optimal composition takes a similar form to the majority
voting outcome, except that median income is replaced by a welfare-weighted
average income measure. Brief conclusions are in section 6.
2 The Economic Environment
This section begins by describing the overlapping generations model with a
public sector, in subsection 2.1. In views of its central role, the condition
under which a majority of each cohort supports the intergenerational social
5Hassler et al. (2007) use a similar assumption (each generation only votes once) to
ﬁnd the political equilibrium in an overlapping generations context. In their study, agents
vote on tax at each period and also decide how the revenue should be spent.
5contract is established in subsection 2.2.
2.1 The Two-Period Framework
Each individual is assumed to live for two periods, a working and a retirement
period, so that the economy is populated by two overlapping cohorts in any
given period. Individuals have identical preferences but are heterogenous
with respect to income endowments. A young individual i,b o r na tt i m et,
works in the ﬁrst period and receives an exogenously ﬁxed income, yi,t.I f
the objective were to examine the choice of income tax rate, the assumption
of exogenous incomes would make no sense, but the emphasis here is solely
on the composition of expenditure. Income is taxed at the rate τ,w h i c hi s
the same for all individuals and is assumed to be exogenously determined.
In period t, a young individual, i, allocates disposable income between
current consumption, c1i,t, and savings, si,t. In the second period of life, the
individual ﬁnances consumption of private goods, c2i,t+1, using the uncon-
ditional and untaxed pension from the government, bt+1, and the return on
savings, (1+r)si,t,w h e r er is the constant interest rate at which individuals
can borrow or lend.6 Government expenditures on pure public goods in t
and t+1are denoted as Gt and Gt+1. Prices are normalised to unity, so that
c denotes private consumption expenditure.
T h et r a n s f e rp a y m e n ti sr e f e r r e dt oh e r ea sap e n s i o n ,s i n c ei ti sr e c e i v e d
in the second period of the life cycle.7 However, it may be thought of more
broadly as a standard type of income transfer since it augments the exoge-
nously ﬁxed income. Assuming perfect capital markets, some low-income
people may wish to vote for a high value of bt+1, part of which is used to
repay a loan in the ﬁrst period while the remainder ﬁnances consumption in
the second period. Conversely high-income individuals may prefer a low, or
even zero, transfer while making positive savings during the working period.
In view of the inter-generational transfers in addition to the income shift-
ing and intra-generational redistribution, it is necessary to allow for popula-
6For simplicity it is assumed that there is no tax on interest income.
7The introduction of an explicit transfer received in the working period would involve
considerable problems arising from multidimentional voting.
6tion and income growth. Suppose the average income of young individuals









where Nt denotes the number of individuals born in period t.H e r e i t i s
assumed that income growth involves an equal proportional change in all
incomes and that population growth involves an equal increase in frequencies
at each income level, so that ω and n are independent.
2.2 Majority Support for The Social Contract
This section examines the condition required for the majority of each gen-
eration to be better oﬀ with the PAYG arrangement, thus ensuring the co-
operation between generations. Consider a situation in which there is no
transfer payment. For any given value of expenditure on the public good, G,
and its associated tax rate, the question concerns the condition under which
an individual (with given yi,t)i sb e t t e ro ﬀ with a transfer payment (and its
associate higher tax rate) compared with a framework in which retirement
income is provided by private savings alone, involving income shifting with-
out the intra- and inter-generational redistribution of the transfers. Clearly,
t h o s ew h oa r em o s tl i k e l yt op r e f e rap r i v a t es y s t e ma r et h o s ew i t hr e l a t i v e l y
high incomes. It is shown here that the condition required for each person’s
support of a PAYG system is independent of the given value of G and of
the transfers (and thus the tax rate). Thus, having established support for
the social contract, it is then possible to consider voting over the precise
composition of expenditure, for a given tax rate.
The context here is thus somewhat diﬀerent from the basic treatment
of social insurance by Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966), who essentially
considered the conditions under which the average consumption of each gen-
eration is higher with a PAYG system. Such a system allows each generation
7to share in the beneﬁts arising from population and productivity growth,
since later generations will be both larger and richer, so long as those gains
are suﬃcient to outweigh the returns from private investment plans. They
found that social insurance can increase average welfare ‘if the sum of the
rates of growth of population and real wages exceeds the rate of interest’
(Aaron, 1966, p. 372).8 The context, like the present treatment, is neverthe-
less conﬁned to a partial equilibrium analysis, so no consideration is given to
the possibility that diﬀerent regimes imply diﬀerent private returns to saving,
arising because total savings in the two systems are substantially diﬀerent.
By considering whether individual i supports a PAYG social contract as
an addition to the ﬁnance of a given value of public good expenditure, com-
parisons between public and private systems are made such that they provide
the same expenditure on public goods in each period. Let a superscript, P,
be used to denote values in the PAYG system with a basic pension (which
may of course be augmented by private savings), while F indicates values in
the scheme with private pension funds only. Thus, GP
t = GF
t = Gt, while tax
rates in the two system are obviously diﬀerent, at τP and τF. The transfer
payment to be received in period t +1is bP
t+1.
From the lifetime budget constraint, the present value of the ith indi-
vidual’s life time income under the PAYG system is given by (1 − τP)yi,t +
bP
t+1/(1 + r). Consider next the privately funded system where there is no
transfer payment and income tax ﬁnances only the provision of public goods.
Individual i’s lifetime income is simply (1 − τF)yi,t.
Since both systems provide the same amount of public good under the two
systems, a suﬃcient condition for utility to be higher in the PAYG system
compared with private funding is that lifetime income is higher. This requires
8Creedy and van de Ven (2000) extend the Aaron-Samuelson analysis by allowing for
labour supply eﬀects of taxation and for increasing longevity. Walque (2005) uses non-
cooperative game theory to examine an overlapping generations model with productivity
and population growth. He assumes that some public transfer payment is proposed and
voters decide to accept or reject it through their vote. The young form the majority at each
time, since population growth is positive. He ﬁnds similar conclusions to Aaron (1966).
8(1 − τP)yi,t +
bP
t+1
1+r > (1 − τF)yi,t, or equivalently:










FNt+1¯ yt+1,( 4 )






PNt+1¯ yt+1.( 5 )
Combining these two constraints, and using GF
t+1 = GP











t+1 from (6) into (3), and using ¯ yt+1 =¯ yt (1 + ω) gives the





> (1 + r).( 7 )
An important feature of this condition is that it is independent of G, b and
τ. Hence agreement by a majority of each cohort for the use of a PAYG
scheme and its associated social contract is established prior to considerations
regarding the choice of actual expenditure levels. For a positively skewed
income distribution, median income, ym,t, is less than the arithmetic mean,
¯ yt: hence the greater the skewness, the more likely is the condition above to
be satisﬁed for given values of the relevant rates.
T h i sc a nb ec o m p a r e dw i t ht h eb a s i cA a r o na n dS a m u e l s o nc o n d i t i o n
in a model without heterogeneity and public goods. The basic Aaron and
Samuelson condition is (1 + n)(1+ω) > (1 + r).9 From (7) the condition
for the ‘average’ individual, for whom yi,t =¯ yt, is precisely the same as the
Aaron-Samuelson condition. The higher-income individuals are more likely
to prefer the privately funded scheme, which involves only income shifting
9It is by ignoring cross-product terms that the condition is often stated as r<n + ω.
9rather than redistribution within and between generations. A majority of
the cohort of workers at time t are more likely to prefer the PAYG scheme
even if the Aaron-Samuelson condition is not satisﬁed.
All individuals must of course comply with the majority voting outcome.
Hence if (1+n)(1+ω)
¯ yt
ym,t > (1+r), a PAYG system is maintained. Those
high-income individuals who would prefer only private funding are not al-
lowed to ‘contract out’ of, or withdraw from, the social contract and the
pension system. Without this compulsory element there would be an adverse
selection problem arising from the gradual reduction in average income, of
those remaining in the system, as the richest individuals gradually contract
out.
3 The Voting Equilibrium
This section examines the majority voting equilibrium composition of ex-
penditure, assuming that the condition required for support of the PAYG
system, established above, is satisﬁed. Voting concerns only on the pension
to be received in the next period, for the given tax rate. Individuals are
assumed to have full information about the government budget constraint.
The resulting public good expenditure is determined from the government
budget constraint, and before voting the working cohort has been committed
to pay for public good expenditure and pensions decided by the previous
cohort. Since there is no incentive for the old to vote they are absent from
the election. Therefore, the median member of the young cohort is the deci-
sive voter. As part of the social contract, young individuals understand that
they must ﬁnance the pension of those currently retired (and of course the
majority of them recognise that they are better oﬀ by doing this). Individ-
ual preferences, where the lifetime indirect utility function is expressed in
terms of the transfer payment, public good expenditure and the tax rate, are
examined in subsection 3.1. The voting equilibrium is derived in subsection
3.2, and subsection 3.3 shows that it is a balanced-growth equilibrium.
103.1 Individual Preferences
Each individual is assumed to have the following Cobb-Douglas lifetime direct
utility function, expressed in logarithmic form:
Ui,t =l o gc1i,t + γ logGt + β (logc2i,t+1 + γ logGt+1),( 8 )
where 0 <β= 1
1+ρ < 1 i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ra n dρ is the time preference
rate, and γ is the weight attached to consumption of public goods. An
alternative approach would be to express utility in terms of the quantity,
QG, of the public good consumed by each person, rather than the total
government expenditure on it. If the good is produced at a constant cost per
unit of p,t h e nG = pQG must continue to appear in the government’s budget
constraint below. However, it can be shown that the results are identical to
those obtained by using the present speciﬁcation.10




=( 1− τ)yi,t +
bt+1
(1 + r)
≡ Mi,t.( 9 )
This form allows for the fact that tax-ﬁnanced public goods are non-excludable
so that individuals are not charged at the point of consumption. To exam-
ine the voting equilibrium it is necessary to obtain each individual’s indirect
utility function, Vi,t, as follows.
The consumption plans, conditional on the values of public expenditure





,( 1 0 )
c2i,t+1 =
β (1 + r)Mi,t
(1 + β)
.( 1 1 )
10This arises from the homothetic nature of the Cobb-Doublas utility function, which
also ensures that consumption does not become concentrated on a single good as popula-
tion size increases. For a detailed analysis of this point in a single-period framework, see
Creedy and Moslehi (2007a). In a general equilibrium model, it is of course expected that
the unit cost, p, would vary as the output share varies.







.( 1 2 )
From (12) an increase in the tax rate and the pension reduces savings, while
an increase in the interest rate increases savings. Without the pension, the
income and substitution eﬀects of changes in the interest rates would oﬀset
each other such that savings would be independent of the interest rate.11
Nevertheless, with a pension, the substitution eﬀect outweighs the income
eﬀect such that an increase in the interest rate increases private savings.
According to the saving function (12) the individual borrows if:





.( 1 3 )
That is, borrowing takes place if disposable income is low in relation to the
pension. These low income individuals would borrow to ﬁnance their ﬁrst
period consumption and repay their debt with the pension received in the
retirement period.
The indirect utility function, Vi,t, is obtained by substituting the optimal
c1i,t and c2i,t+1 into the direct utility function (8), whereby:







β (1 + r)Mi,t
(1 + β)
¶
+ γ (logGt + β logGt+1).( 1 4 )
However, the pension and public goods expenditure in each period are ﬁ-
nanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Hence the values of Gt and Gt+1
can be expressed in terms of bt and bt+1 using the government budget con-
straint; there is only one degree of freedom in policy choices. The government
budget constraint is given by:
Gt + Nt−1bt = τNt¯ yt.( 1 5 )
Substituting into (14) gives indirect utility:
Vi,t =l o g
µ





β ((1 + r)(1 − τ)yi,t + bt+1)
1+β
¶
+γ log(τNt¯ yt − Nt−1bt)+βγlog(τNt+1¯ yt+1 − Ntbt+1).( 1 6 )
11This is a particular property of Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
12Indirect utility is therefore a function of bt+1 along with other variables and
preference parameters.
3.2 Majority Voting
From (16), voting involves only one dimension, the value of bt+1,b e c a u s ea l l
other variables determining an individual’s indirect utility are either prede-
termined or exogenously given. If the indirect utilities for all young indi-
viduals are single-peaked, it is known that the majority voting outcome is
dominated by the median voter, who in the present context is the individual
with median income, ym,t.
Single-peakedness is guaranteed if the relationship between Vi,t and bt+1
is strictly concave for all individuals, that is, if ∂2Vi,t/∂b2
t+1 < 0 for all i.T h i s
condition is conﬁrmed by diﬀerentiation of (16). Consequently, maximizing
the indirect utility function with respect to bt+1 gives the majority choice of





(1 + r)(1 − τ)ym,t + bm,t+1
−
βγNt
τNt+1¯ yt+1 − Ntbm,t+1
=0 ,( 1 7 )

















.( 1 8 )
By substituting bm,t+1 i n t ot h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta tt i m et +1 ,












.( 1 9 )
The focus here is on the ratio of the total expenditure on pension to that on
public goods, Rm,t+1,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
Rm,t+1 =
(1+β)
βγ (1 + n)(1 + ω)τ − (1 + r)(1 − τ)
ym,t
¯ yt
(1 + n)(1 + ω)τ +( 1+r)(1 − τ)
ym,t
¯ yt
.( 2 0 )
13This result shows that Rm,t+1 depends, inter alia,o nt h er a t i oo fm e d i a ni n -
come to mean income at time t and parameters regarding population growth,
income growth, tax rate and preference. Changing absolute income levels by
a shift in the distribution of income does not aﬀects the majority choice of
the composition of expenditure; only the ratio of median to mean income
matters. The growth rates of population and incomes, n and ω,a l s oa p p e a r
in a symmetric fashion in (20); they both have the same eﬀect on Rm,t+1.
Substituting (18) into (13) gives the criterion for borrowing by individual




(1 + β)(1+n)(1+ω)τ − βγ(1 + r)(1 − τ)
ym,t
¯ yt
β(1 + r)(1+β + βγ)(1− τ)
.( 2 1 )
This result shows that individual i borrows to ﬁnance ﬁrst-period consump-
tion if the ratio of i’s income to average income is less than some critical
value, which is determined by the ratio of median to mean income, among
other parameters.
3.3 The Balanced Growth Path
In this subsection the voting equilibrium is shown to be a balanced-growth
equilibrium in which all endogenous variables, including total expenditure
on public goods and pensions, total consumption for young individuals and
for old individuals, and total savings by young individuals, grow at the same
rate.
First, the crucial ratio, ym,t/¯ yt, is constant, since income growth is as-
sumed to involve an equal proportional increase at all income levels. This
implies by equation (18) that the majority choice of pension per old indi-
vidual, bm,t+1, grows at the same rate as the average income of individuals,
¯ yt, and consequently total expenditure on the pension, Ntbm,t+1 ≡ Bm,t+1,
grows at the same rate as the total income of individuals. That is, pen-
sion per capita grows at rate ω and total pension expenditure grows at the
rate, n+ω.12 Similarly, by equation (19) total expenditure on public goods,
Gm,t,g r o w sa tt h er a t e ,n + ω, and public goods expenditure per capita,
12This ignores the term nω in the expansion of (1 + ω)(1+n).
14Gm,t/(Nt−1 + Nt), grows at the rate, ω. As a result, the ratio of pension
expenditure to public goods expenditure is a constant, as also conﬁrmed by
equation (20).
The period-t total consumption of young individuals, Nt
PNt
i=1 c1i,t,t o t a l
savings of young individuals, Nt
PNt
i=1 si,t, and total consumption of old in-
dividuals, Nt−1
PNt−1
i=1 c2i,t, can be expressed by substituting bm,t+1 into (10),
(12) and (11). All these variables grow at the rate, n + ω, and their per
capita terms grow at the rate, ω.
Hence, the voting equilibrium is characterised by a balanced growth path,
along which all aggregate endogenous variables grow at the same rate as
aggregate income, and per capita variables grow at the same rate as average
income. For simplicity incomes are assumed to be exogenously determined
in the model. But it can be easily and naturally incorporated into the model
that income growth results from exogenous technological progress. Hence
these implications regarding the balanced growth path are consistent with
those of neoclassical growth models with exogenous PAYG social security,
despite the fact that the social security is determined by majority choice in
the present model.
4 Some Comparative Statics
This section presents some comparative static properties of the model. The
aim is to examine how total expenditures on pension, Bm,t+1, public goods,
Gm,t+1,a n dt h e i rr a t i o ,Rm,t+1, change in response to changes in parameters
of the model. As shown in equations (18),(19) and (20), these relations are
nonlinear. The signs of ﬁrst and second derivatives of these variables with
respect to each parameter are reported in Table 1.
Ak e yd e t e r m i n a n ti sym,t/¯ yt,t h er a t i oo fm e d i a nt oa v e r a g ei n c o m e .A
rise in ym,t/¯ yt represents a fall in inequality. First, Bm,t+1 and Gm,t+1 are
linearly decreasing and increasing in ym,t/¯ yt, respectively, suggesting that
higher inequality causes voters to vote on higher pension expenditure and
lower public goods expenditure. This implies that a rise in inequality would
lead to a higher ratio of pension expenditure to public goods expenditure.
15Table 1: Comparative Statics of Median Voter’s Choice of Expenditure on
Pension and Public Goods and Their Ratio
ym,t/¯ yt τγβrωn
First Derivative
Bm,t+1 − + −−−++
Gm,t+1 + ++++++
Rm,t+1 − + −−−++
Second Derivative
Bm,t+1 00 + + 0 0 +
Gm,t+1 00 −−00+
Rm,t+1 + − +++−−
This is conﬁrmed by a negative ﬁrst derivative of Rm,t+1 with respect to
ym,t/¯ yt. The second derivative of Rm,t+1 with respect to ym,t/¯ yt is positive,
implying that the ratio of pension expenditure to public goods increases at
an increasing rate as inequality rises.13
It is also of interest to consider how the majority choice of total expendi-
ture on pensions and public goods change with the tax rate. Clearly Bm,t+1
is linearly increasing in τ.14 However, Gm,t+1 is also linear in τ, but increases
with τ only if (1+n)(1+ω)−(1+r)
ym,t
¯ yt > 0. This condition is the same as
that derived above for majority support for the PAYG social security system.
The majority choice of the composition of government expenditure, Rm,t+1
is increasing in τ unambiguously, but at a decreasing rate, if again the con-
dition for majority support for the social contract is satisﬁed. These results
suggest that an increase in the tax rate gives the government more income to
spend on both types of expenditure, but the increase in pension expenditure
i sr e l a t i v e l yh i g h e rt h a nt h ei n c r e a s ei np u b l i cg o o d se x p e n d i t u r e . 15
The comparative static results with respect to γ suggest that an increase
in the weight on public goods in the utility function unambiguously increases
the total expenditure on public goods, but decreases total expenditure on
13A negative relationship between basic equality and the transfer payment relative to
pubic good expenditure was also found by Creedy and Moslehi (2007a,b) in a static model.
14If labour supply were aﬀected by the tax rate, this property would clearly be modiﬁed.
15However, Creedy and Moslehi (2007a, b) ﬁnd a concave relationship between the
expenditure ratio and the tax rate. This arises because they allow for adverse incentive
eﬀects arising from the tax and transfer system.
16pensions and the ratio of pension to public goods expenditure.
The results with respect to β suggest that an increase in the discount
factor has a negative eﬀect on the total expenditure on pensions and on
the ratio of pensions to public goods, but increases the total expenditure
on public goods. This result can be understood from a positive relationship
between a young individual’s savings and the discount factor; see equation
(12). A higher discount factor, that is a higher weight on second-period
utilities, leads to more private savings by individuals at a young age, such
that individuals tend to vote on a lower public-saving-pension, which results
in a higher public goods expenditure and a lower ratio of pension to public
goods expenditure.
An increase in the interest rate has similar eﬀects to those of an increase
in the discount factor. It increases public goods expenditure, but decreases
expenditure on pensions and its ratio to public goods expenditure. This
is clear from the condition for majority support for the social security sys-
tem, in equation (7). An increase in the interest rate raises the return on
private savings such that individual are more likely to prefer the privately
funded scheme; that is, individuals are more likely to vote on a lower pension
expenditure.
Regarding parameters governing the growth of income and population,
the results show that increases in ω and n increase total expenditure on
pension and on public goods, and also their ratio. With income growth or
population growth, tax revenues of the government are increased such that
the government is able to spend more on both types of expenditure. However,
the increase in the expenditure on pensions is higher than the expenditure
on public goods because a higher n and ω make individuals more likely to
prefer the PAYG system, as shown in (7).
Consider the special case where n = ω =0and r = ρ =0 .T h i sn o - g r o w t h
and no-discounting situation implies a steady state in which endogenous vari-
ables remain constant over time, and substitution in (20) gives:
Rm,t+1 =
τ
γ/2 − (1 − τ)
ym,t
¯ yt
τ +( 1− τ)
ym,t
¯ yt









τ +( 1− τ)
ym,t
¯ yt
(1 + Rm,t+1).( 2 3 )
T h i sm a yb ec o m p a r e dw i t ha ne c o n o m yw i t hr = ρ =0but with positive








ξτ +( 1− τ)
ym,t
¯ yt
(1 + Rm,t+1).( 2 4 )
Hence, the growing economy — with the same tax rate and initial values of
ym,t
¯ yt and Rm,t+1 — has a smaller absolute response of the expenditure ratio to
a change in
ym,t
¯ yt .16 Furthermore, it can be shown that a non-zero value of ρ
produces a result similar to (24) except that ξτ in the denominator is replaced
by a term in which τ is multiplied by a constant depending on ρ and ξ;t h i si s
lower than ξ and therefore implies a slightly higher response, compared with
the growing economy with zero ρ, than otherwise (again given that the two
economies initially have the same τ,
ym,t
¯ yt and Rm,t+1). This contrasts with
non-zero values of r, which do not aﬀect this response. A comparison with a
single-period version of the model is made in Appendix A.
4.1 Numerical Examples
The comparative static analysis provides a general idea of whether the com-
position of government expenditure would increase or decrease following a
change in a given parameter of the model. However, it does not show the
precise sensitivity of the composition with respect to changes in parameters.
This subsection reports some numerical examples to illustrate these proper-
ties, which may help identify some important factors underlying the observed
variations in the composition of government expenditure across countries.
To set a baseline value for each parameter, assume the length of a time
period in the model is 20 years. The average annual growth rate of world
GDP per capita and world population during the period 1986-2006 are 0.016
16The assumption that they have the same initial values of R here requires the preference
parameter to diﬀer between economies.
18and 0.014, respectively.17 Therefore, ω is set to 0.37 (given by (1+0.016)20−
1). Similarly, n is 0.33 (given by (1+0.014)20 −1). The annual real interest
r a t ep e ry e a ri sr o u g h l y4 per cent, so r is 1.19 (given by (1+0 .04)20 − 1).
Assuming that the time preference rate is equal to the interest rate , ρ = r,
then β is set to 0.46 (given by 1/(1+0.04)20). The baseline value for the tax
rate, τ, is set to 0.35. The preference parameter, γ, is chosen such that, with
other parameter values determined as above, the expenditure ratio matches
the average ratio for a sample of 24 democratic countries.18 This yields a
value of γ equal to 0.75.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate variations in the relationship between Rm,t+1
and ym,t/¯ yt, for given values of the other parameters. As expected, increas-
ing ym,t/¯ yt reduces Rm,t+1 at a decreasing rate in all ﬁgures, demonstrating
that higher equality is consistently associated with a lower ratio of pension
expenditure to public goods expenditure. The three diagrams of Figure 1
show in turn the eﬀects on the relationship of varying ω, n and r around
their baseline values. The variations considered are 15 per cent and 30 per
cent changes around the baseline value. By taking percentage variations it is
possible to make statements about the relative sensitivity to diﬀerent para-
m e t e rc h a n g e s .T h et h r e ed i a g r a m so fF i g u r e2s h o wt h ee ﬀects of varying τ,
β and γ respectively. As each parameter is changed, the relationship between
Rm,t+1 and ym,t/¯ yt is found to shift, though not in a parallel fashion.
As shown in the top two diagrams of Figure 1, increasing income and
population growth rates produces upward shifts in the proﬁle of the ratio of
expenditure on pensions to public goods. However, these impacts are quan-
titatively small, implying that the composition of government expenditure
is not sensitive to variations in the growth rates of income and population.
The bottom diagram of Figure 1 shows that increasing the interest rate shifts
downwards the expenditure ratio proﬁle, and this eﬀect is quantitatively more
pronounced than the shifts arising from growth rate variations.
Figure 2 shows that increasing the discount factor and the preference pa-
17The source of both data is World Development Indicators 2007.
18See Creedy and Moslehi (2007a) for the data on public goods and transfer payments.
They ﬁnd that the average value of ratio of expenditure on transfer payment to public
goods for 24 democratic countries is 0.63, with an average wage ratio of 0.85.
19Figure 1: Variation in Expenditure Ratio for Alternative Growth Rates and
Interest Rates
20Figure 2: Variations in Expenditure Ratio for Alternative Tax Rates, Dis-
count Factors and Preference Parameters
21rameter, γ, considerably shifts downwards the relationship between Rm,t+1
and ym,t/¯ yt. Increasing the tax rate shifts the expenditure ratio proﬁle up-
wards, and the eﬀect is quantitatively relatively large. Comparing these
ﬁgures highlights the point that the majority choice of the composition of
government expenditure is quite sensitive to variations in the tax rate, dis-
count factor and the weight of public goods in the utility function, while less
sensitive to changes in the interest rate and growth rates of population and
income. This indicates the importance of preference parameters in shaping
the composition of expenditure.
These results perhaps throw some light on the mixed nature of empiri-
cal studies, using cross-sectional data for a range of countries, which have
attempted to test the conclusion of earlier tax models regarding the relation-
ship between redistribution and basic inequality. The results suggest ﬁrst
that, over the most relevant range of ym,t/¯ yt, the response of the expenditure
ratio to a change in inequality is expected to be very low. Secondly, the
expenditure ratio is sensitive to a range of variables (other than the tax rate)
which are typically not included in the empirical investigations. For example,
although inequality in Scandinavian countries is lower than in other countries,
such as the USA, these countries have more redistributive policies.19 This
may be related to the diﬀerent preferences of people in Scandinavia compared
with the USA, rather than any inadequacy of the underlying model.20
5 Maximising a Social Welfare Function
The majority choice of expenditure proportions, examined in previous sec-
tions, is determined by the selﬁsh preferences of the person with median
income. Given the unchanged ratio of ym to ¯ y in steady state growth, the
actual situation of the rich and poor is irrelevant. It is therefore of interest
19Creedy and Moslehi (2007a) found that the average of ym,t/¯ yt (2000−2006) for Den-
mark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were 0.91, 0.89, 0.90 and 0.90 respectively. However,
the average ym,t/¯ yt (2000 − 2006) for USA was 0.75.
20Nevertheless, Lind (2005) discussed various complexities not treated by the models,
such as the existence of multiple social contracts, prospect of upward income mobility,
multi-dimensional policies, race and redistribution versus social insurance.
22to evaluate the outcome in terms of a social welfare function, expressed in
terms of the utilities of all individuals. This section examines the optimal
composition of expenditure, deﬁned as that which maximises a social wel-
fare function deﬁned in terms of the lifetime utilities of individuals in each
cohort. Only a single cohort needs to be considered because in equilibrium
growth, the same composition applies to each cohort and the social contract
is also stable.21 The social welfare function reﬂects the value judgements of
an independent judge or decision maker, and is maximised subject to the gov-
ernment PAYG budget constraint. The optimal allocation of expenditure is
obtained as a point of tangency of the highest social indiﬀerence curve which
can be reached subject to the government’s budget constraint. Indiﬀerence
curves are ﬁrst examined, followed by the tangency solution
The social welfare function at time t is considered to be a general function
of lifetime indirect utility of the young cohort at time t,s ot h a t :
Wt = W (V1,t,...,Vi,t,...VNt,t),( 2 5 )
where Vi,t is lifetime indirect utility of individual i as deﬁn e di n( 1 4 ) .T h i s
function is individualistic, Paretean and concave with respect to bt+1 and



















dGt+1.( 2 6 )
Deﬁne vi,t = ∂Wt
∂Vi,t
∂Vi,t
∂bt+1 as the welfare weight attached to an increase in i’s















.( 2 7 )
Social indiﬀerence curves describe combinations of Gt+1 and bt+1 for which
















.( 2 8 )
21Hence it is not necessary to consider a transition from, say, a private pension to a
PAYG transfer payment.
23The slope of social indiﬀerence curves is therefore a weighted sum of the ratio












(1 + r)(1 − τ)yi,t + bt+1
.( 3 0 )
Substituting into (28) and writing ˜ yt =
PNt
i ˜ vi,tyi,t gives:
dbt+1
dGt+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Wt
= −
βγ{(1 + r)(1 − τ)˜ yt + bt+1}
Gt+1 (1 + β)
.( 3 1 )
The term ˜ yt is a weighted average of incomes, with weights, ˜ vi,t.









.( 3 2 )
Equating the slope in (31) with (32) gives the tangency solution for the
optimal pension, bW,t+1,a s :
Gt+1 (1 + β)=βγNt ((1 + r)(1 − τ)˜ yt + bt+1).( 3 3 )
Substituting for Gt+1 from the government budget constraint gives:
bW,t+1 =
¯ yt (1 + β)
(1 + β + βγ)
×
½
(1 + n)(1+ω)τ −
βγ
(1 + β)




.( 3 4 )
Comparing this result with the median voter’s choice of bm,t+1 in (18) shows
that the two expressions are identical except for the fact that the majority
choice depends on ym,t/¯ yt whereas maximization of a social welfare function
depends on ˜ yt/¯ yt.T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence is in the relevant income ratios. The
same feature must of course apply to expenditure on the public good and the
expenditure ratio.
The expression for ˜ yt actually conceals considerable complexity. Strictly,
(34) is not a closed-form solution because ˜ yt actually depends on the optimal
values themselves. However, Appendix B examines the relationship between
24ym,t/¯ yt and ˜ yt/¯ yt using an approximation in which the weighted income ˜ yt
is replaced by the equally-distributed equivalent income. This is the income
which, if equally distributed, gives the same social welfare as the actual distri-
bution, for a welfare function deﬁned in terms of incomes. If the distribution
of income is lognormal and the welfare function takes the additive iso-elastic








,( 3 5 )
where ε denotes the relative inequality aversion of the judge. The optimal
expenditure levels and their ratio can thus be expressed in terms of ym,t/¯ yt,
just as in the majority voting framework, except that there is an additional
degree of nonlinearity in the expressions, involving the term ε. By substi-
tuting (35) into (34) it can be shown that, as expected, an increase in ε is
associated with an increase in the optimal expenditure ratio.22 Only an in-
dependent judge having ε =1would evaluate the majority voting outcome
as optimal.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined the composition of government expenditure, consid-
ered as the outcome both of majority voting and optimizing by a benevolent
government. The main focus was on public goods and a transfer payment, in
the form of a pension (which can nevertheless be used to augment ﬁrst-period
consumption). Tax-ﬁnanced expenditure is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go ba-
sis. A two-period overlapping generation model was constructed in which
individuals have similar preferences but diﬀerent incomes. Individuals work
during the ﬁrst period of life, pay a proportional income tax, and either
save or borrow. During the second period of life, the retirement period,
22The relationships between optimal pension, public goods and their ratio and ym,t/¯ yt
are diﬀerent from those with majority voting. First, although total expenditure on pension,
BW,t+1, and public goods, GW,t+1, are decreasing and increasing in ym,t/¯ yt respectively,
this relationship is not linear. If ε<1 the second derivative of BW,t+1 and GW,t+1 with
respect to ym,t/¯ yt is positive and negative respectively. The relationship between the
optimal ratio and ym,t/¯ yt is negative, but the second derivative is undetermined.
25they receive the tax-ﬁnanced transfer payment. The condition under which
there is majority support for the social contract involved in a pay-as-you-go
ﬁnancing structure was established, providing an extension to the familiar
Aaron-Samuelson condition. This condition was found to be independent of
tax rates and the expenditure levels, so that it is possible to consider the
choice of actual amounts, conditional on the social contract being supported.
Using the positive, majority voting, approach, selﬁsh individuals vote in
the ﬁrst period on their pension to be received in the next period, given the
tax rate and full information about the nature of the government’s budget
constraint (including growth rates of incomes and population). Therefore,
voting is over one dimension and expenditure on public goods obtained from
the government’s budget constraint. Preferences are single-peaked and the
decisive voter is the young individual with the median income, since the old
cohort does not have incentive to vote on next period’s pension. The compar-
ative static results of this majority choice show that the ratio of expenditure
on pension to public goods falls at a decreasing rate when the ratio of median
to mean income increases, and the proﬁle is relatively ﬂat for realistic values
of the income ratio. Numerical results show that the ratio of expenditure on
pensions to public goods is more sensitive to changes in inequality, prefer-
ences parameters and tax rate compared with changes in rates of population
and income growth.
In the second and normative approach, a social welfare function in term
of individuals’ lifetime utilities is maximized subject to the government’s
budget constraint, again for a given tax rate. The expressions for the choice
of expenditure levels and their ratio were found to take the same form as in
the majority voting context, except that a welfare-weighted average of in-
come replaces median income. Although this does not provide a closed-form
solution, because the weighted average itself depends on optimal values, an
approximation using the concept of an equally-distributed equivalent income
was obtained in the special case of an iso-elastic welfare function and a log-
normal income distribution, allowing the same expression to be used. It was
found that an independent judge with constant relative inequality aversion
of unity would evaluate the majority voting outcome as also optimal.
26Although the analysis has concentrated on the composition of govern-
ment expenditure, rather than choice of the tax rate, it has in common with
many other models the property that a higher degree of basic inequality is
associated with a more redistributive structure. However, the comparative
static results suggest that, over the relevant range, diﬀerences in the ratio
of transfer payments to public good expenditure arising from diﬀerences in
inequality are likely to be small. Furthermore, the ratio is relatively sensitive
to preference parameters (the time preference rate and weight attached to
public goods in utility functions). This suggests that in a cross-sectional com-
parison of democratic countries, a simple relationship between redistribution
and basic inequality may not necessarily be observed.
The modelling framework, involving two overlapping generations and
ﬁxed incomes, is in some ways extremely simple. Nevertheless, considera-
tion of the choice of tax-ﬁnanced public good expenditure and the level of
a pension is substantially complicated by the fact that the pension involves
a combination of income-shifting between phases of the life cycle (in addi-
tion to that provided by private savings) with both inter-generational and
intra-generational transfers. The latter arises because the basic pension is un-
related to income whereas the tax is proportional to income, and the former
arises from the pay-as-you-go feature of ﬁnancing whereby each generation
can beneﬁt from productivity and thus income growth accruing to the fol-
lowing generation. It is suggested that the approach therefore oﬀers useful
insights into the relevant relationships involved.
27Appendix A: A Static Model
This appendix considers a single-period version of the model, in which the
transfer payment is received by all individuals, rather than being a pension.
The utility function and budget constraint facing individual i are:
Ui =l o g ci + γ logG,( A . 1 )
ci = yi (1 − τ)+b.( A . 2 )
For a population of N, the government budget constraint is:
G/N = τ¯ y − b,( A . 3 )
where, as before, ¯ y is arithmetic mean income. By substituting (A.2) and
(A.3) into (A.1) the indirect utility function, Vi, is obtained as a function of,
b,s ot h a t :
Vi =l o g{yi (1 − τ)+b} + γ log{N (τ¯ y − b)}.( A . 4 )
Since ∂2Vi/∂b2 < 0, preferences are single-peaked. Consequently, the solution
for the majority voting outcome is found by maximising the median voter’s





ym (1 − τ)+bm
−
γ
(τ¯ y − bm)
=0 ,( A . 5 )










.( A . 6 )
The corresponding value of Gm is obtained by substituting bm into the govern-
ment budget constraint, and the ratio of per capita expenditure on transfer
payment to public goods, Rm = bm/(Gm/N) is given by:
Rm =
τ
γ − (1 − τ)
ym
¯ y
τ +( 1− τ)
ym
¯ y
.( A . 7 )
This may be compared with (22) above, which takes the same form except
that the latter has γ/2 instead of γ.
28This allows comparisons to be made between the majority choice of ex-
penditure on public goods, transfer payment and their ratio in this static
model with the two-period dynamic model where n = ω =0and r = ρ =0 .
Suppose the preferences parameter, γ, is same in both models. In the static
model the majority choice of transfer payments and public goods are re-
spectively lower and higher than two-period overlapping generations model
with n = ω =0and r = ρ =0 .23 However, care is needed in making such
comparisons because, in the static case, all individuals beneﬁt—a tt h et i m e
of voting — from the transfer payment as well as public good expenditure.
In the dynamic model it is only the young working cohort that, in the ﬁrst
period, vote on next period’s transfer payment conditional on knowing that
the next young generation will ﬁnance that pension.
Appendix B: Comparing Income Ratios
In section 5, it was found that a welfare-weighted average income, ˜ y,p l a y s
a crucial role in determining the optimal composition of expenditure. This
measure is highly complex, even for simple social welfare functions. However,
it is useful to consider an approximation, for the ubiquitous case where the








i,t ε 6=1 ,ε>0.( B . 1 )
Here it is useful to work with the multiplicative form of the Cobb-Douglas






t+1.24 Consequently, indirect utility,
from (16), can be rewritten as:
Vi,t =
³










t+1.( B . 2 )
23The absolute diﬀerence between public goods and transfer payment in the static and
dynamic model with no-growth and no-discountingis equal to
γ{τ+(1−τ)(ym,t/¯ yt)}
(1+γ)(2+γ)
24Such a monotonic transformation does not of course aﬀect the majority voting out-
come, but optimal values are aﬀected.
29From (B.1), ∂Wt/∂Vi,t = V
−ε
i,t . And using ∂Vi,t/∂bt+1 from (B.2), the welfare
weights, vi,t = ∂Wt
∂Vi,t
∂Vi,t

















.( B . 3 )
Suppose bt+1 is small relative to yi,t. In this case an approximation, denoted

















,( B . 4 )
with θ = β −ε(1 + β).T h u s˜ yA is the ratio of two fractional moments. Sup-
pose further that yi,t is lognormally distributed as Λ(yi,t|μt,σ 2
t),w i t hm e a n
and variance of logarithms of μt and σ2
t respectively. Using the properties of
the lognormal moment generating function, it can be found that:25
˜ yA,t =e x p
µ












.( B . 5 )
The ﬁnal term in this expression is close to, but less than, unity. This
is because β is less than one. Also, reasonable values of ε are small and
< 1.26 However, the use of the assumption that bt+1 can be neglected in (B.3)
actually attaches too much weight to the lower incomes, and thus imparts a
downward bias to the approximation. One approach is thus to ‘correct’ for
this downward bias by excluding the ﬁnal term in (B.5). This gives:
˜ yA,t =e x p
µ





.( B . 6 )
A feature of this result in (B.6) is that ˜ yA,t is in fact closely related to Atkin-
son’s measure of the inequality of income. Following Atkinson (1970), let
yede,t denote the ‘equally distributed equivalent’ income, representing the
equal income which gives the same welfare as the actual distribution, using a
25On the lognormal distribution, see Aitchison and Brown (1957).
26In the cross-sectional inequality context, questionnaire studies involving consideration
of the ‘leaky bucket’ experiment found values for respondents which averaged around 0.2;
see Amiel, Creedy and Hurn (2001).
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Again using lognormal properties, the term y
1−ε
ede,t has mean and variance of
logarithms respectively of (1 − ε)μt and (1 − ε)
2 σ2
t,s ot h a t :
yede,t =e x p
µ













.( B . 8 )
Consequently, the ratio of the equally distributed equivalent to the arithmetic



























.( B . 9 )
Furthermore, as ym,t = eμt:
ym
¯ yt













.( B . 1 1 )
If ˜ yt is approximated by yede,t, (B.11) gives the required relationship between
the two income ratios reported in Section 5 above.
It is important to test the value of the above approximation. Hence values
of the expenditure components using the approximation ˜ yA = yede were com-
pared with those obtained using a simulated population of size 15000 drawn
at random from a lognormal distribution with μ =9 .0 and σ2 =0 .5.27 Using
the simulated distribution, a range of values of bt+1 were investigated. For
each bt+1 the government budget constraint was used to obtain Gt+1 and the
resulting values were used to calculate each individual’s level of utility. These
27This implies that ¯ y = 10405 and ym/¯ y =0 .78.
31were then used to obtain social welfare, using the iso-elastic function with a
speciﬁed inequality aversion parameter, ε. Finally, given a large number of
Wt measures, the maximum was determined, giving the optimal composition.
In order to compare welfare values, the expenditure values obtained from the
approximation was used with the simulated population. Table 2 gives the
results for a range of inequality aversion, ε, with other baseline parameters.







0.8 3087 1532 0.863 3460 1372 0.925 -0.011
0.5 2907 1609 0.774 3452 1376 0.930 -0.028
0.2 2713 1692 0.687 3442 1380 0.936 -0.043
These results show that the approximation does indeed give values of
expenditure levels and ratios which are reasonably close to those obtained
using a large simulated population. The percentage diﬀerence of the social
welfare function using the approximation from that obtained by simulation,
%∆W, is in each case found to be small, at less than half a percentage point.
This reﬂects the relative ﬂatness of the proﬁle relating Wt to bt+1 (for given
parameter values) as well as the closeness of the approximation.
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